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Abstract:	  This	  study	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  evaluate	  the	  effects	  of	  product	  and	  labour	  market	  
regulations	   on	   industry	   productivity	   through	   their	   various	   impacts	   on	   changes	   in	  
production	  prices	  and	  wages.	  In	  a	  first	  stage,	  the	  estimation	  of	  a	  regression	  equation	  on	  
an	   industry*country	   panel,	   with	   controls	   for	   country*industry	   and	   country*year	   fixed	  
effects,	  show	  that	  multi-­‐factor	  productivity	   is	  negatively	  and	  significantly	   influenced	  by	  
both	   indicators	   of	   industrial	   prices	   from	   same	   industry	   and	   weighted	   average	   of	  
industrial	  prices	  from	  other	  industries,	  and	  by	  indicators	  of	  country	  wages	  weighted	  by	  
industry	  labour	  shares	  for	  low	  and	  high	  skilled	  workers.	  In	  a	  second	  stage,	  an	  economic	  
policy	  simulation	  of	  the	  implications	  these	  results	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  calibration	  by	  the	  
OECD	   product	   and	   labour	  market	   anti-­‐competitive	   regulation	   indicators	   suggests	   that	  
nearly	   all	   countries	   could	   expect	   sizeable	   gains	   in	   multifactor	   productivity	   from	  
deregulation	  reforms.	  
	  
JEL	  classification:	  C23,	  L16,	  L50,	  O43,	  O47	  
Keywords:	  Productivity,	  market	  regulations,	  rents	  
	  
 
We	  are	  grateful	  to	  Francesco	  Venturini	  and	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  their	  comments.	  We	  have	  
also	   benefitted	   from	   suggestions	   of	   participants	   at	   the	   various	   seminars	   and	   meetings	   where	  
previous	  versions	  of	  this	  paper	  were	  presented,	   in	  particular	  the	  AEA	  Annual	  Meeting	  2016	  (San	  
Francisco),	  AFSE	  Conference	  2015	  (Rennes),	  AMSE	  and	  Banque	  de	  France	  seminars,	  EcoMod	  2016	  
(Lisbon)	  and	  the	  SEM	  Conference	  2015	  (Paris).	  The	  views	  expressed	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  those	  of	  the	  
authors	  and	  do	  not	  necessarily	  reflect	  those	  of	  the	  institutions	  they	  belong	  to.	  
                                                
* Address: Pôle d’Economie et de Gestion, 2 boulevard Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 
DIJON cedex, France (Tel. +33 380395442, Email: jimmy.lopez@u-bourgogne.fr). 
REVIEW	  OF	  ECONOMICS	  AND	  INSTITUTIONS	  Vol.	  7,	  Issue	  2,	  Autumn	  2016,	  Article	  1	  
Copyright  ©  2016  University  of  Perugia  Electronic  Press.  All  rights  reserved.   2	  
1 Introduction 
A large body of literature investigates the productivity impacts of prod-
uct and labor market imperfections, and of the anti-competitive regula-
tions establishing and supporting them (see Aghion and Howitt 2009 for a 
survey). This paper greatly extends the scope of two previous studies by 
the authors (Bourlès et al., 2013, and Cette et al. 2016) that focus on the 
‘indirect’ productivity impact of non-manufacturing regulations using 
country*industry panel data.1 
According to our previous empirical investigations using the OECD 
regulation indicators, non-manufacturing anticompetitive regulations in 
industries producing intermediate inputs curb the productivity of indus-
tries using these inputs (this effect is called the ‘indirect’ impact of regula-
tions in this paper).2 On a country*industry panel that is basically the 
same as in the other two previous studies, this new paper allows to assess 
and compare the relative size of the different channels of direct and indi-
rect impacts of product and labor market regulations on productivity, by 
considering the effects of these regulations through their various impacts 
on production prices and wages. The paper also takes advantage of the 
rich information provided by the OECD regulation indicators, but it does 
so only indirectly for economic policy calibration and simulation pur-
poses. The originality of our new approach is twofold. First, to our 
knowledge, it is the first attempt to assess the consequences on productiv-
ity of anti-competitive regulations in product and labor markets through 
their impacts on production prices and wages.3 Thus, this paper tests 
whether the indirect impact of anticompetitive regulations is due to their 
effects on firm market power. Second, thanks to the use of production 
prices and wages, it does so by considering in conjunction the six channels 
through which regulations can impact MFP: direct and indirect influence 
of product market regulations on rent building in manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industries, and direct influence of labor market 
regulations on the rent sharing process between firms on the one hand 
and skilled and unskilled workers on the other. 
                                                
1      This indirect impact on productivity is also investigated by few other studies: (i) 
Allegra et al. (2004), Forlani (2010) and Arnold et al. (2011) using single country data; 
(ii) Barone and Cingano (2011) mobilizing cross section data; (iii) Conway et al. (2006) 
mobilizing country-industry panel data (but these authors did not distinguish 
between the direct and indirect effects); and (iv) Franco et al. (2016) mobilizing also 
country-industry panel data and focusing on innovation efficiency using a stochastic 
frontier analysis. The estimation results of these papers are not directly comparable to 
Bourlès et al. (2013), and Cette et al. (2016) results, but are qualitatively consistent with 
them.  
2      Bourlès   et   al.   (2013)   find   also   evidence   that   the   indirect   impact   of   anticompetitive  
product   market   regulations   on   productivity   is   stronger   close   to   the   technological  
frontier,   whereas   Cette   et   al.   (2016)   find   that   a   good   part   of   this   indirect   impact   is  
transmitted  through  investments  in  both  R&D  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  ICT.  
3      Askenazy  et  al.   (2013)  rely  on  similar  assumptions  and  data   to  analyse   the  effects  of  
anticompetitive  regulations  on  the  country*industry  changes  in  income  shares.  
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Our approach is theoretically grounded in the model developed by 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). In their own words, “their model is built 
on two basic assumptions: monopolistic competition in the goods market, 
which determines the size of rents; and bargaining in the labor market, 
which determines the distribution of rents between workers and 
firm.”(ibidem, pp. 879-880). In other words, firms can take advantage of the 
market power permitted by product market anti-competitive regulations 
to charge higher production prices and generate rents that they can be 
kept in the form of increased profits. Workers can also capture in the form 
of higher wages a share of these rents, which varies with their bargaining 
power, it largely influenced by labor market regulations. Our empirical 
framework is an attempt to assess the productivity impact of regulations 
as mediated by their effects on the changes on production prices and 
wages. It can be simply explained by the diagram of Figure 1, which we 
shall now comment. 
 
Figure	  1.	  Diagram	  of	  the	  Overall	  Framework	  
	   	  
 
The right side of the diagram outlines the regression equation central to 
our investigation. It shows the channels by which the six price and wage 
indicators, key in the analysis, relate to Multifactor Productivity (MFP). 
The left side of the diagram shows the calibration relationships, which 
validate our use of six price and wage indicators as proxies of the product 
and labor market imperfections impacts, and allow us to perform simula-
tions of the MFP gains resulting from structural reforms of product and 
labor markets, as gauged by the OECD indicators for Non-Manufacturing 
Regulations (NMR), Harmonized tariffs (HT) and Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL). 
The regression equation assumes that product market imperfections in 
an industry generate higher production prices and rents, which have a 
“direct” impact on MFP in the same industry and an “indirect” impact on 
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MFP in other industries. The two price indicators of direct impacts meas-
ure the extent to which what we label “Manufacturing” industries and 
Non-Manufacturing” industries are able to charge relatively high prices. 
They thus benefit from large rents and have fewer incentives to improve 
their efficiency and to innovate but also more financial resources to do so. 
We can thus expect an impact on MFP that could be either negative or 
positive. A negative sign may a priori seem more likely for non- 
manufacturing industries generally sheltered from foreign competition 
and often protected from national competition by product market 
regulations. But this may also be true for manufacturing industries when 
they are protected from foreign competition by high tariff barriers. The 
two price indicators of indirect impacts are similarly indicative of weaker 
incentives to improve efficiency and to innovate by “downstream” indus-
tries when the rents they can generate are appropriated by “upstream” 
industries that have market power and can charge them relatively high 
prices for the intermediate inputs they must use. In this case, however, the 
expected impact on MFP is unambiguously negative. Again and for the 
same reasons this should be more likely when the upstream industries are 
non-manufacturing industries than manufacturing industries. Our regres-
sion equation also assumes that, in conjunction with product market 
imperfections in an industry, labor market imperfections may result in 
higher wages and lower profits, entailing a negative impact on the indus-
try MFP. Employment protection legislation, professional agreements and 
standards, shortage of qualified workers, etc., contribute to higher wages, 
implying that rents, which could have been fully appropriated by firms’ 
owners and shareholders, are shared with workers. In turn, firms have 
fewer incentives and financial resources to improve their efficiency and to 
innovate. We can thus expect that the low- and high-skilled wage indica-
tors have a negative impact on MFP. Since high-skilled workers have a 
stronger bargaining power than low-skilled workers, it is also likely that 
the negative impact would be larger for the former than the latter. 
In Section 2, we describe our country*industry panel data sample, de-
fine in detail the six production price and wage impact indicators, and dis-
cuss in depth the econometric specification of our regression model. Our 
main estimation results are presented and discussed in Section 3. They 
show that the estimated coefficients of our six impact indicators are all 
negative and are both statistically and economically significant. In Section 
4 we consider an illustrative policy simulation based on these results and 
on their calibration by the OECD product and labor market 
anti-competitive regulation indicators, which suggests that nearly all 
countries could expect sizeable gains in multifactor productivity over the 
years from an economic policy of deregulation reforms. Section 5 offers a 
short conclusion, stressing the plausibility of our results but also their 
fragility and limitations, largely inherent in the aggregate nature of our 
framework and supporting data. 
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2 Regression Model and Data 
Our analysis is based on an unbalanced country*industry*year panel 
data sample covering fourteen OECD countries and eighteen industries: 
thirteen mainly in “Manufacturing” and five mainly in “Non- 
Manufacturing”. Due to the lack of data for several countries and/or 
sectors in the earlier years, it is relatively unbalanced ranging for each 
country*industry time series from 1987 to 2007 at maximum, six years at 
minimum and about 12 years on average. The fourteen countries are: 
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, It-
aly, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. For the sake of convenience, “Manufacturing” refers here to: 
food products, textiles, wood products, paper, chemicals products, 
non-metallic mineral products, metal products, machinery not elsewhere 
classified (n.e.c.), electrical equipment, transport equipment, manufactur-
ing n.e.c., as well as construction and hotels & restaurants; while 
“non-manufacturing” refers to: energy, transport & communication, retail 
distribution, banking services and professional services. Overall, our panel 
data sample contains 2,820 observations, when we exclude the United 
States that we have taken in our analysis as the country of reference to 
control for unobserved technical changes at the industry level. 
Production prices, intermediate consumption and data used to calculate 
MFP come mainly from OECD databases, while wages by skill level and 
physical investments by assets (used to calculate MFP) come from the 
EUKLEMS database. The regulation indicators that we use to assess the 
economic significance of our results and to calibrate simulations of the 
potential impacts of structural reforms are constructed on the basis of the 
OECD indicators for NMR, HT and EPL. Appendices A and B provide de-
tailed information on the panel composition, the construction of variables 
and the OECD indicators. They also show some simple descriptive statis-
tics. As shown in the Diagram, in our regression model, MFP expressed in 
logarithm and noted as 𝑚𝑓𝑝!"# for country c, industry i and year t, is re-
lated to four impact indicators based on production price data, two “di-
rect” impact indicators 𝐷𝑀_𝑝!"#  and 𝐷𝑁𝑀_𝑝!"# for manufacturing indus-
tries and non-manufacturing industries respectively, and two “indirect” 
impact indicators 𝐼𝑀_𝑝!"#  and 𝐼𝑁𝑀_𝑝!"#  for impacts on “downstream” 
industries originating from “upstream” manufacturing and non- 
manufacturing industries respectively. They also consist of two impact 
indicators based on low-skilled (L) and high-skilled (H) wage data noted 𝐽𝐿_𝑤!"# and 𝐽𝐻_𝑤!"#. The direct country*industry price impact indicators 
are simply defined as: 
 𝐷𝑀_𝑝!"# = 𝑝!"#  with  𝑖 ∈ 𝑀    𝑎𝑛𝑑    𝐷𝑁𝑀_𝑝!"# = 𝑝!"#  with  𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 
 
where 𝑝!"# is the logarithm of the production price index relative to the 
GDP price index, for country c, industry i and year t, normalized to be 
equal to one in year 2000 (with 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀 for the manufacturing industries 
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and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑀  for the non-manufacturing industries). Because of the 
aggregate nature of our panel sample, the price direct impact coefficients 
we can expect to estimate with good precision are two average 
country*industry elasticities (not separate elasticities by country or 
industry, or country*industry). 
The country*industry price indirect impact indicators are composite 
indicators of the same production prices but for the upstream industries, 
and are defined as: 
 𝐼𝑀_𝑝!"# = 𝑝!"# ∙ 𝑈𝑆𝐸!!!∈!  &!!!         𝑎𝑛𝑑      𝐼𝑁𝑀_𝑝!"# = 𝑝!"# ∙ 𝑈𝑆𝐸!!   !∈!"  &!!!  
 
where 𝑈𝑆𝐸!! is the intensity-of-use of intermediate inputs, defined as the 
ratio of the intermediate consumption from industry j to industry i over 
the production of industry i and measured on the basis of the 2000 in-
put-output table for the USA, taken as country of reference in our analysis. 
Here also, the coefficients that can be precisely estimated are two average 
country*industry elasticities with respect to the manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industries. For that purpose, interacting the log up-
stream industry price with the intermediate input intensity-of-use ratio is 
an appropriate way to take into account the intrinsic heterogeneity of their 
potential impact on downstream multifactor productivity, assuming that 
the higher this ratio, the higher the impact of a given change in upstream 
industry price. Note also that we prefer to use the USA 2000 input-output 
table as a weighting fixed reference in the computation of the inten-
sity-of-use ratios to avoid endogeneity biases that might arise from poten-
tial correlations between the country*industry changes in such ratios and 
productivity. For a similar reason we also exclude the intra-industry 
intermediate consumption in the computation. The low- and high-skilled 
country*industry wage impact indicators are defined as: 
 𝐽𝐿_𝑤!"# = 𝑤!"! ∙ 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸!!            𝑎𝑛𝑑              𝐽𝐻_𝑤!"# = 𝑤!"! ∙ 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸!! 
 
where 𝑤!"!  and 𝑤!"!  are the country’s real wage index, in logarithms, for 
the low- and high-skilled workers of country c, and 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸!!  and 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸!! are the corresponding shares of labour costs in the production 
value of industry i for the USA in 2000. As in the case of the price direct 
and indirect impact indicators, the coefficients we can hope to estimate 
accurately enough are two average country*industry elasticities. Similarly 
to what we do to construct the price indirect impact indicators, we deem 
appropriate to interact the log country’s low- and high-skilled wages with 
the corresponding labor costs shares in production at the industry level for 
the USA in 2000, assuming that the higher these changes, the higher the 
impact of a given change of a given change in low- and high-skill industry 
wage. To also avoid potential endogeneity biases we rely on the USA 2000 
industry shares as fixed reference. Note finally that since we found that 
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the estimated elasticities of the indicators based on separate low- and 
medium-skilled wages were not statistically different, we pool them for 
the sake of greater precision as one indicator, to which we simply refer 
here as the low-skilled wage impact indicator.  
Finally, our first regression specification is the following: 𝑚𝑓𝑝!"# = 𝛼   ∙ 𝐷𝑀!!" !!! + 𝛽 ∙   𝐷𝑁𝑀!!" !!! + 𝛾   ∙ 𝐼𝑀!!" !!!  +𝛿   ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝑀_𝑝!" !!! + 𝜆 ∙   𝐽𝐿_𝑤!"(!!!) + 𝜇   ∙ 𝐽𝐻_𝑤!"(!!!) + 𝜃   ∙𝑚𝑓𝑝!"  ! !!!    +𝜂! + 𝜂! + 𝜂! + 𝜂!" + 𝜂!" + 𝜀!"#                  (1) 
 
In addition to the six prices and wage impact indicators defined above, 
we included the log USA multifactor productivity for industry i and year 
(t-1) 𝑚𝑓𝑝!"  ! !!!  in order to control mainly for exogenous technical 
changes at the industry level. We chose the USA, which is at the world 
productivity frontier in most industries, as an appropriate reference coun-
try for our analysis. α, β, γ, δ, λ and & are our elasticity parameters of 
interest. 𝜀!"# is the idiosyncratic random error of the regression. 𝜂!, 𝜂! 
and 𝜂! denote the one-way country, industry and year fixed effects that 
are usually included in regression models estimated on panel data sam-
ples such as ours in order to control for distinctive country, industry or pe-
riod characteristics, which could affect the estimates of the parameters of 
interest. 𝜂!"  and 𝜂!"  stand for two-way country*industry and coun-
try*year fixed effects. We present also estimation results adding indus-
try*year 𝜂!" to the set of fixed effects. The fixed effects are an important 
component in our regression specification for reasons we shall make clear 
in explaining our estimation method. 
As a variant of our regression specification (1), we have also considered 
the following simpler specification (2): 
 𝑚𝑓𝑝!"# = 𝛼   ∙ 𝐷!!" !!! + 𝛾 ∙   𝐼!!" !!! + 𝜆 ∙ 𝐽!!" !!!    +𝜃 ∙   𝑚𝑓𝑝!"  ! !!! + 𝜂! + 𝜂! + 𝜂! + 𝜂!" + 𝜂!" + 𝜀!"#                  (2) 
 
where 𝐷_𝑝!"# , 𝐼_𝑝!"# , 𝐽_𝑤!"#  are respectively the production price 
indicators of direct and indirect impacts pooled over manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industries and the wage indicators of impact pooled 
over low- and high-skills. 
3 Estimation and Main Results 
Before presenting our main results, we must explain how they have 
been estimated to take care of various sources of potential biases, and in 
particular why we entered two-way country-industry and country-year 
fixed effects in our regression model. The purpose of including 𝜂!" and 𝜂!" is to correct for the biases which could be due to the omission of rele-
vant explanatory variables and also to attenuate biases potentially arising 
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from other sources of endogeneity. It does so at the cost of reducing the 
variability of the data on which our estimates are actually based and at the 
risk of exacerbating downward biases from measurement errors in varia-
bles.4 Actually, entering 𝜂!" in regression (1) is a necessity in the present 
context since our price and wage indicators do not measure absolute levels 
of price or wage but are computed from price and wage indices normal-
ized to be equal to 1 in a given reference year (in our case 2000). The evi-
dence on which we rely for estimation is thus only based on the within 
country*industry changes over time of the variables in the regression, 
implying an important cut back in their standard-deviation conditional on 𝜂!" (as shown in Table A1.1 of Appendix 1). Including also the coun-
try*year fixed effects 𝜂!"  entails an additional reduction of variability, 
especially large for the price indirect impact and wage impact indicators. 
It is, however, a useful precaution protecting from a variety of sources of 
potential estimation biases, such as differences in country multifactor 
productivity not related to product or labor market imperfections (and not 
captured by the presence of 𝑚𝑓𝑝!"  ), and simultaneity biases due to 
changes in prices and wages in response to country productivity shocks. It 
is also possible to go one more step further and substitute industry*year 
fixed effects 𝜂!" to 𝑚𝑓𝑝!"   to control more fully for industry technical 
changes and other variation in industry multifactor productivity. Notably, 
the inclusion of 𝜂!" may offset the endogeneity bias resulting from the 
over-time correlation of competition changes within countries and across 
industries. This issue may concern particularly industries such as energy, 
transport and communications in which international agreements and 
regulations are widespread. We present estimates with and without 
industry*year fixed effects. The inclusion of these fixed effects would be, 
however, at the cost of reducing even more the identifying variability of 
the data, and it would be at the risk of exacerbating downward biases 
from measurement errors in variables. As discussed in Cette et al. (2016), 
we can view the regression results obtained when including only the 
country*year fixed effects 𝜂!" or both the country*year and industry*year 
fixed effects (𝜂!"  and 𝜂!" ) as providing respectively upper and lower 
bound estimates, but we can also put some more confidence on the upper 
bound estimates and focus on them as our preferred estimates. Besides 
controlling for interacted fixed effects in our regression, we prefer not to 
rely on the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator but to implement the 
Dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimator proposed by Stock and Watson (1993).5 
This estimator has the advantage to make sure that the estimated 
elasticities are not biased by short-term correlations between the variables 
and the idiosyncratic error   𝜀!"# ,  and that we can consider them as 
long-term parameters. When the variables used are non-stationary, the 
                                                
4  See Griliches and Mairesse (1998) who document and strongly stress such risk in the 
context of the identification of production function on panel data. 
5      We have found that it is enough to keep only one lead and one lag of these first 
differences.     
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DOLS estimator eliminates these short-term correlations by including in 
the regressions leads and lags of the first differences of the potentially 
endogenous explanatory variables.6 Finally, note that we have lagged in 
regression (1) all explanatory variables by one year as another safeguard 
to avoid spurious contemporaneous correlations with productivity 
changes. Our main estimation results are given in Tables 1 and 2, with the 
estimated impact elasticities in column 5 of Table 1 for the specification (2) 
and of Table 2 for the more detailed specification (1). 
 
Table	  1.	  Main	  Estimates	  for	  Less	  Detailed	  Regression	  Specifications 
LHS:	  MFP	  (mfp)	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	   (7)	  
Estimator	   DOLS	  (with	  one	  lead	  and	  one	  lag)	   OLS	  
US	  MFP	  (mfpus)	   0.688***	   0.821***	   0.704***	   0.808***	   0.720***	   -­‐	   0.687***	  
	   [0.014]	   [0.013]	   [0.014]	   [0.012]	   [0.014]	   	   [0.013]	  
Direct	  prices	  (D_p)	   -­‐0.513***	   	   -­‐0.523***	   	   -­‐0.441***	   -­‐0.248***	   -­‐0.460***	  
	   [0.034]	   	   [0.033]	   	   [0.033]	   [0.030]	   [0.031]	  
Indirect	  prices	  (I_p)	   	   -­‐0.486***	   -­‐0.546***	   	   -­‐0.479***	   -­‐0.278***	   -­‐0.392***	  
	   	   [0.074]	   [0.070]	   	   [0.068]	   [0.090]	   [0.064]	  
Wage	  impact	  indicator	   	   	   	   	   -­‐2.338***	   -­‐2.091***	   -­‐0.499*	   -­‐1.650***	  
(J_w)	   	   	   	   [0.165]	   [0.170]	   [0.285]	   [0.157]	  
Observations	   2820	   2820	   2820	   2820	   2820	   2820	   2820	  
R-­‐squared	   0.779	   0.76	   0.785	   0.774	   0.798	   0.872	   0.783	  
Fixed	  effects	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Country*Industry	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	  
Country*Year	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	  
Industry*Year	   N	   N	   N	   N	   N	   Y	   N	  
***	  Significant	  at	  1%;	  **	   significant	  at	  5%;	  *significant	  at	  10%.	  Standard	  errors	  between	  brackets.	  All	   the	  
explanatory	  variables	  are	  one	  year	  lagged. 
 
Columns 1 to 4 of these two tables show the corresponding estimated 
elasticities for specifications in which the price direct and indirect impact 
indicators and the wage impact indicators are introduced sequentially. 
Column 6 shows the robustness of the estimation results to the inclusion 
of industry*year fixed effects and column 7 to the use of the OLS estimator 
instead of the DOLS one. 
Focusing first on the estimates for the full specifications (column 5) of 
regression speciation (1) and (2), we see that the estimated elasticities for 
all impact indicators are negative and statistically very significant, with 
standard errors roughly proportional to their size (i.e. with comparable 
Student t-statistics and relative precision). 
 
                                                
6   To support our long-term interpretation of our estimation results and our reliance on 
the DOLS estimators, we performed Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003) panel data 
unit-root tests on our dependent and explanatory variables and Pedroni (1999, 2004) 
panel data cointegration tests. All the unit-root tests confirm that our variables are I(1), 
whereas the cointegration tests are somewhat less clear-cut, with four out of seven 
rejecting the no-cointegration null hypothesis. However, because of the short time 
dimension of our panel data sample, the power of these tests is relatively weak.  
 
REVIEW	  OF	  ECONOMICS	  AND	  INSTITUTIONS	  Vol.	  7,	  Issue	  2,	  Autumn	  2016,	  Article	  1	  
Copyright  ©  2016  University  of  Perugia  Electronic  Press.  All  rights  reserved.   10	  
	  
Table	  2.	  Main	  Estimates	  for	  Less	  Detailed	  Regression	  Specifications 
LHS:	  MFP	  (mfp)	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	   (7)	  
Estimator	   DOLS	  (with	  one	  lead	  and	  one	  lag)	   OLS	  
US	  MFP	  (mfpus)	   0.713***	   0.818***	   0.731***	   0.835***	   0.756***	   -­‐	   0.717***	  
	   [0.015]	   [0.012]	   [0.014]	   [0.013]	   [0.015]	   	   [0.014]	  
Direct	  prices	  in	  
Manufacturing	  
industries	  
-­‐0.481***	   	   -­‐0.434***	   	   -­‐0.379***	   -­‐0.130***	   -­‐0.406***	  
(DM_p)	   [0.037]	   	   [0.037]	   	   [0.037]	   [0.033]	   [0.034]	  
Non-­‐Manuf.	  Industries	   	   -­‐1.051***	   -­‐1.072***	   	   -­‐0.827***	   -­‐0.719***	   -­‐0.785***	  
(DNM_p)	   	   [0.085]	   [0.088]	   	   [0.090]	   [0.080]	   [0.080]	  
Indirect	  prices	  from	  
Manufacturing	  
industries	  
-­‐0.488***	   	   -­‐0.475***	   	   -­‐0.446***	   -­‐0.271***	   -­‐0.359***	  
(IM_p)	   [0.072]	   	   [0.070]	   	   [0.069]	   [0.091]	   [0.064]	  
Non-­‐Manuf.	  Industries	   	   -­‐9.361***	   -­‐7.490***	   	   5.060***	   -­‐0.798	   -­‐4.838***	  
(INM_p)	   	   [0.852]	   [0.863]	   	   [0.898]	   [0.872]	   [0.844]	  
Country	  wages	  *	  industry	  labor	  share	  
High	  Skills	   	   	   	   -­‐4.239***	   -­‐3.043***	   -­‐2.162***	   -­‐2.412***	  
(JH_w)	   	   	   	   [0.320]	   [0.329]	   [0.477]	   [0.292]	  
Low	  Skills	   	   	   	   -­‐2.037***	   -­‐1.743***	   -­‐0.112	   -­‐1.327***	  
(JL_w)	   	  	   	  	   	  	   [0.223]	   [0.215]	   [0.339]	   [0.202]	  
Observations	   2820	   2820	   2820	   2820	   2820	   2820	   2820	  
R-­‐squared	   0.777	   0.773	   0.792	   0.779	   0,804	   0.877	   0.788	  
Fixed	  effects	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Country*Industry	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	  
	   Country*Year	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	  
	   Industry*Year	   N	   N	   N	   N	   N	   Y	   N	  
***	  Significant	  at	  1%;	  **	   significant	  at	  5%;	  *significant	  at	  10%.	  Standard	  errors	  between	  brackets.	  All	   the	  
explanatory	  variables	  are	  one	  year	  lagged. 
 
We find very large and significant differences between the manufactur-
ing and non-manufacturing direct and indirect price impact estimated 
elasticities and the low and high-skill wage impact estimated elasticities: 
they are twice for 𝐷𝑁𝑀_𝑝 than for 𝐷𝑀_𝑝 (about 0.8 versus 0.4), ten times 
higher for 𝐼𝑁𝑀_𝑝 than for 𝐼𝑀_𝑝 (about 5.0 versus 0.5), and almost twice 
also for 𝐽𝐻_𝑤 than for 𝐽𝐿_𝑤 (3.0 versus 1.7). 
Looking now at the robustness of these estimates to omission bias, we 
find that the three pooled impact elasticities are only moderately decreas-
ing whenever another indicator is included, but not the point of becoming 
statistically different. The six detailed impact elasticities appear less ro-
bust. In particular the elasticity of 𝐼𝑁𝑀_𝑝 varies from -5.1, if estimated 
only with 𝐼𝑀_𝑝, to -9.4 if estimated with all other indicators. Similarly the 
elasticity of 𝐽𝐻_𝑤 varies from -3.0 to -4.2. All six elasticities remain nega-
tive and statistically very significant, and on the whole satisfactory. 
Concerning the estimate robustness to the inclusion of industry*year 
fixed effects 𝜂!", we find that, in spite of the inherent uncertainties of our 
analysis, our estimates of the prices and wages impact indicators elastici-
ties appear fairly robust overall in specification (1) and (2). When we con-
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trol for both 𝜂!"  and 𝜂!" , the estimated elasticities are significantly 
smaller, but all elasticities are negative as expected and most are in fact 
not statistically different from the specification without 𝜂!" at the 5% or 
10% confidence level (see column 6). However, the detailed estimates of 
specification (2) appear less stable than the pooled ones of specification (1): 
the price indirect impact elasticity from non-manufacturing and the 
low-skill wage impact elasticity, which stand out as very much reduced, 
are no more statistically significant from zero (even at a 10% confidence 
level). Such extreme reduction with loss of statistical significance is most 
likely related to the very small residual identifying variability of the two 
corresponding price and wage impact indicators 𝐼𝑁𝑀_𝑝 and 𝐽𝐿_𝑤 and 
possibly reflects large attenuation biases due to the exacerbation of 
measurement errors in these indicators. 
Finally, columns 7 of Tables 1 and 2 show the estimate robustness to the 
use of the OLS instead of DOLS estimator. Although the choice of the 
DOLS estimator is confirmed by means of a Hausman test, we can see that 
the OLS and DOLS estimates are very close for all elasticities. 
4 Simulation of the Impact of Structural Reforms 
The estimation results for regression (1) appear quite satisfactory, i.e. 
with productivity elasticities of all our price and wage indicators of the ex-
pected sign, statistically significant and reasonably robust. However, they 
cannot unambiguously be interpreted in terms of productivity impacts of 
anti-competitive regulations in the product and labor markets, and thus 
cannot directly be used to assess the potential effects of structural reforms 
in these markets. Moreover, despite the great care we have taken to avoid 
specification error biases in estimating our regression model, it is indeed 
important to confirm that our production price and wage indicators indi-
rectly capture the impacts of regulations. We address these two issues by 
calibrating them in relation to the OECD NMR and HT indicators on the 
one hand and to the OECD EPL indicators on the other hand. As docu-
mented in some details in Appendix 2, the OECD indicators are con-
structed on the basis of very detailed information on laws, rules and mar-
ket, country and industry settings, and they have thus the advantage of 
being directly related to underlying policies and they can be considered, at 
least to a major extent, to be exogenous to productivity developments. 
The estimation results of the calibration are presented in Table 3. We 
have performed four distinct OLS projections on the OECD indicators: (i) 
the country*industry changes on production prices in non-manufacturing 
industries on the NMR indicators (column 1); (ii) the country*industry 
changes on production prices in manufacturing industries on the HT 
indicators (column 2); the country changes in low-skilled wages on the 
EPL indicator (column 3); and (iv) the country changes in high-skilled 
wages on the EPL indicator (column 4). The projection coefficients esti-
mates we find corroborate our hypotheses that changes in production 
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prices and wages are positively and significantly related to changes in the 
OECD regulation indicators. 
 
Table	  3.	  Long-­‐term	  Calibration	  Relationships 
Dep.	  variable	  
Relative	  production	  prices	   Real	  wages	  
Non-­‐manuf.	  
Industries	  
Manuf.	  industries	   High-­‐skilled	   Low-­‐skilled	  
	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
Regulation	  
indicators(a)	  
0.024***	   0.031***	   0.030*	   0.087***	  
[0.005]	   [0.005]	   [0.017]	   [0.017]	  
Observations	   753	   2067	   238	   238	  
R-­‐squared	   0.457	   0.201	   0.808	   0.828	  
***	  Significant	  at	  1%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  *significant	  at	  10%.	  Standard	  errors	  between	  brackets.	  
Columns	  (1)	  &	  (2):	  Country*Industry	  panel	  with	  country*industry	  and	  country*year	  fixed	  effects.	  
Columns	  (3)	  &	  (4):	  Country	  panel	  with	  country	  and	  year	  fixed	  effects.	  
(a)	  The	  regulation	   indicators	  are	  the	  NMR	   indicators	   in	  column	  1,	  the	  HT	   indictors	   in	  column	  2	  and	  the	  EPL	  
indicator	  in	  column	  3	  and	  4.	  
  
By means of this calibration we can interpret and assess the estimates of 
regression (1) in terms of two illustrative simulations of the potential 
long-term MFP gains by country. The first is an ex-post evaluation of the 
long-term effects of the observed regulatory changes on the product and 
labor markets during the 2008-2013 period. This simulation, also detailed 
in Appendix 3, shows that the MFP gains attributable in the long term to 
these changes are about 0.6% on average and are mainly due to reforms on 
product markets, with the higher gains (of about 2%) for Austria and Italy. 
The second simulation that we present now is an ex-ante evaluation of the 
potential long term effects of extreme, hypothetical, regulatory reforms if 
they had been implemented all at once in 2013. We suppose for the pur-
pose of this simulation that the “lightest practice” regulations observed as 
of 2013 could be immediately enforced in all industries, where “lightest 
practices” are defined as the averages of the three lowest levels of regula-
tions in the fourteen countries of our sample. 7  Such pervasive and 
simultaneous switch to lightest practices is thus an overly extreme, simpli-
fied, illustration of structural reforms in product and labor markets, 
ignoring of course the many and great institutional and political difficul-
ties of implementation. The results of this simulation are presented in the 
Bar chart of Figure 2, where the height of bars indicates the long-term 
overall MFP impacts of adopting lightest practices for each country, and 
the breath of their components corresponds to the contributions of adopt-
ing the lightest practices related to the NMR, HT and EPL regulations 
respectively. 
                                                
7      Although we take the USA as the reference country and thus exclude it from our 
estimation sample; we include it in our simulation and in the definition of lightest 
practices, by simply extending to this country the average impact elasticity estimates 
obtained for the thirteen countries of the estimation sample. Note also that we assume 
that the HT indicators in 2013 are the same as in 2008, since OECD stopped computing 
them after this year.  
Cette,	  Lopez	  and	  Mairesse:	  Product	  and	  Labor	  Market	  Regulations	  




Figure	  2:	  Simulated	  Long-­‐term	  Impacts	  on	  MFP	  from	  the	  Adoption	  of	  the	  Lightest	  
Practices	  by	  Country	  
 
EPL	  –	  High-­‐Skilled	  and	  EPL	  –	  Low-­‐Skilled:	  Long-­‐run	  impacts	  through	  high	  and	  low-­‐skilled	  wages,	  
respectively.	  
NMR	   –	   Indirect	   and	   NMR	   –	   Direct:	   Long-­‐run	   indirect	   and	   direct	   impacts	   through	   production	  
prices	  in	  non-­‐manufacturing	  industries,	  respectively.	  
HT	  –	  Indirect	  and	  HT	  –	  Direct:	  Long-­‐run	  indirect	  and	  direct	  impacts	  through	  production	  prices	  in	  
manufacturing	  industries,	  respectively.	  
 
We see that the average MFP long-term gains are of about 4.4%, but 
that they vary broadly across countries, depending on the initial 
regulation levels, from 1.1% in the UK to 7.0% in the Czech Republic. The 
regulatory components of these gains differ widely across countries from 
one another in absolute size but are close enough in relative terms. The 
average MFP gains from product market reforms amount to 2.5%, and 
they arise for 60% and 26% from respectively the indirect and direct 
impacts of the NMR and HT reforms in non-manufacturing industries, and 
for only about 6% and 8% from respectively the indirect and direct 
impacts of these reforms in manufacturing industries. The average gains 
from the EPL reforms are of about 2.0%, resulting for 75% and 25% from 
respectively the low-skilled and high-skilled labor market reforms. It is 
also interesting to point out the positive correlations between the size of 
the simulated MFP gains from the HT and EPL reforms and from the NMR 
and EPL reforms: respectively 0.26 and 0.21 as computed over fourteen 
countries. This is significant evidence of the complementary linkage 
between the productivity impacts of regulations on the product and labor 
markets that is stressed in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2013). 
The average and country simulated MFP impacts from a sudden shift to 
the lightest regulatory practices shown in Figure 2 are long term gains. As 
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also detailed in Appendix 3, on the basis of a complementary approximate 
analysis of the respective adjustments of the changes in MFP, production 
prices and wages and OECD indicators, we can have an idea of the overall 
speed of evolution to the long-term equilibrium. The results are illustrated 
by the graphs in Figure 3 for the five following large European countries: 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. They suggest that on average 
about 30% of the long-term MFP gains could be achieved after six years on 
average. 
 
Figure	   3.	   Simulated	   Evolution	   of	   Impacts	   on	  MFP	   from	   the	   Adoption	   of	   the	   Lightest	  
Practices	  for	  France,	  Germany,	  Italy,	  Spain	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  
 
5 Conclusions  
This study is an attempt to assess the productivity consequences of 
anti-competitive regulations in product and labor markets by investigat-
ing them through the lens of an analysis of the relationships between 
changes in production prices and wages and changes in multifactor 
productivity. In our analysis, production prices and wages are indicative 
of rent building and sharing processes, which impede productivity in 
different ways and to different extents, and which stem from market 
imperfections as gauged by the OECD product and labor market regula-
tions indicators. The results are encouraging notwithstanding the great 
difficulties of the approach and limitations of relying on a macroeconomic 
country*industry panel. Two simulations, respectively ex-post and 
ex-ante, based on these results suggest that nearly all countries, particu-
larly European countries, can expect significant gains in multifactor 
productivity over the years from economic policies reforming 
anticompetitive regulations on the product and labor markets. 
Our estimates and simulations suffer clearly from various weaknesses, 
due in particular to the data limitation, with implications of course on the 
econometric methods implemented. They should be taken with particular 
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caution and the policy indications that they suggest considered as tenta-
tive. In particular, the ex-ante simulation of an extreme, hypothetical of a 
program of product and labor market reforms consisting in the immediate 
adoption of country lightest regulation practices must only be viewed as 
illustrative. We also do not consider in our analysis the great institutional, 
political and social difficulties that the implementation of such ambitious 
structural reform programs usually encounters. 
We can stress, however, that the evidence concerning the indirect im-
pact of product market regulatory changes in non-manufacturing, which 
is strongest in our present results analysis, is very much consistent with 
our previous two evaluations based on an approach largely different in 
important respects from the one followed here (see Bourlès et al., 2013, 
and Cette et al. 2016). We can also mention that a number of historical 
country experiences seem to confirm that ambitious structural reform 
programs implemented over the last decades have had very large 
multifactor productivity impacts. This is the case of the reform programs 
implemented in the Netherlands in the early 1980 or in Australia, Canada 
and Sweden in the early 1990 that have been followed in the subsequent 
decade by a much faster growth in multifactor productivity (see Bergeaud 
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Appendix 1. Study Sample and Main Variables 
A1.1 Study Sample 
Our study sample is an unbalanced country-industry panel dataset of 
2,812 observations from 1987 to 2007, which have been assembled from 
several sources of data, primarily the STAN OECD data base and which 
we have already used in our two previous studies (Bourlès et al. 2013, and 
Cette et al. 2016). For the purpose of this analysis we had to complete it as 
mainly concerns the production prices and wages information. It covers 
fourteen countries (Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and the United States) and eighteen industries, which we pooled 
in two groups of industries delineated mainly for reasons of congruence 
with the OECD regulation indicators HT and NMR (see Appendix 2). The 
first group, referred as Manufacturing, consists of thirteen industries, 
eleven of which are properly in manufacturing: food products, textiles, 
wood products, paper, chemicals products, non-metallic mineral products, 
metal products, machinery non elsewhere classified (n.e.c.), electrical 
equipment, transport equipment, manufacturing non elsewhere classified 
(n.e.c.), and two other industries construction and hotels & restaurants, 
which we thought were more appropriately included in this group. The 
second group comprises five network and service industries: energy, 
transport & communication, retail distribution, banking services and 
professional services, which for simplicity we call Non-Manufacturing 
industries. 
A1.2 MultiFactor Productivity (MFP) 
Our regression model, referred as (1) in the text, is expressed in terms of 
MFP levels. These levels are calculated for a base year (2000) and then ex-
tended over the sample period using data on MFP growth calculated as 
follows (using small letters for logarithms): 
 Δ𝑚𝑓𝑝!"# = Δ𝑣𝑎!"# − 𝛼! .Δ𝑙!"# + 𝛽! .Δ𝑐!"#! + 𝛾! .Δ𝑐!"#!" + Δ𝑐!"#! + 𝜃! .Δ𝑘!"#  
 
where 𝑉𝐴!"# is the Value Added at constant price of country c, industry i 
at time t, L is the total employment in number of workers, 𝐶! 𝐶!"   and 𝐶! 
the physical capital stocks of, respectively, Information and communica-
tion technology (I), Non-ICT equipment (NI) and non-residential Structure 
(S), K the Knowledge capital stock and 𝛼!,   𝛽!,   𝛾!    and   𝜃!   the output elastic-
ity of these factors in industry i, approximated by the factor cost shares 
over total cost in the USA, averaged on the 1987-2007 period for each 
industry. Remember that regression (1) including country*industry fixed 
effects, our estimates of the impact parameters of interest are in fact 
independent of the MFP levels and relate only to MFP growth rates. Capi-
tal stocks 𝐶!,   𝐶!"   and   𝐶! and K are calculated from investment data us-
ing the so called permanent inventory method, assuming constant 
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geometric rates of depreciation: 5% for non-residential structures, 10% for 
non-ICT equipment, 20% for ICT equipment and 25% for R&D. In order to 
compute investments at constant prices, we have used investment defla-
tors at the national level. Because of the lack of specific price information 
for R&D, we have used as a proxy the manufacturing production deflator. 
To improve comparability, we have assumed that in all countries for the 
ICT investments in hardware, software and telecommunications equip-
ment the ratio of investment prices to the GDP price is the same as for the 
USA. This correction appears indeed as important since the USA is the 
country that uses most systematically hedonic methods to measure these 
prices and that the quality improvements have been considerable for these 
products during the study period. Data on value added and employment 
come from the OECD STAN database, data on R&D expenses from the 
ANBERD OECD database and on physical investments for non-residential 
structures, non-ICT and ICT equipment from the EU KLEMS database. 
Since R&D is not yet treated as investment in the national accounts col-
lected by OECD, we had to correct both the industry value added by add-
ing (“expensing out”) the intermediate consumption of their R&D activi-
ties, and the industry number of employees by subtracting the number of 
R&D personnel (“avoiding double counting”). Note also that we had to 
modify the price index of value added, and hence its value at constant 
prices, for the “Electrical and optical equipment” industry, which includes 
ICT equipment. We assumed as for ICT investment that in this industry 
the ratio of value added prices to the GDP price is the same in all countries 
as for the USA.  
 
Figure	  A1.1.	  Country	  Box	  Plot	  of	  log	  MFP	  Growth	  
 
MFP	  growth	  rates=	  log	  (MFPt)	  –log	  (MFPt-­‐1)	  in	  percent	  
 
The country Box Plots of Figure A1.1 shows that MFP growth rates cannot 

















































REVIEW	  OF	  ECONOMICS	  AND	  INSTITUTIONS	  Vol.	  7,	  Issue	  2,	  Autumn	  2016,	  Article	  1	  
Copyright  ©  2016  University  of  Perugia  Electronic  Press.  All  rights  reserved.   20	  
they also differ significantly in average by country, the median MFP 
growth i ranging from 0.35% in Spain and 1.01% in Canada to 2.97% and 
4.28% in the Czech Republic. 
A1.3 Production Prices and Wages indexes 
In regression model (1), as explained in section II of the text, we have 
computed the price indicators of direct and indirect impacts with respect 
to manufacturing and non-manufacturing: 
 𝐷𝑀_𝑝!"#,   𝐷𝑁𝑀_𝑝!"#,   𝐼𝑀_𝑝!"#  and   𝐼𝑁𝑀_𝑝!"#   
  
on the basis of the country*industry production prices indexes to the 
country GDP price index, which are available in the OECD STAN data-
base. We have computed similarly the low and high-skilled wage indica-
tors of impact: 
 𝐽𝐿_𝑤!"#   and   𝐽𝐻_𝑤!"#  
 
using the country wage indexes relative to the country GDP price index, 
which come from the EUKLEMS database. As noted in the text, what we 
refer as low-skilled indicator 𝐽𝐿_𝑤!"# is in fact combined with the me-
dium- skilled indicator, with some gain of precision in estimation. The Bar 
chart of Figure A1.2 shows the manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
sample average annual growth rates of country production prices relative 
to GDP price. Except for Japan, all these growth rates relative to GDP price 
growth rate are negative, and quite limited in average per year. We see 
nonetheless significant differences across countries and a wider relative 
average decrease for manufacturing than for non-manufacturing indus-
tries.  
 
Figure	  A1.2.	  Sample	  Average	  Annual	  Growth	  of	  Relative	  Production	  Prices	  
 
 
Similarly, the Bar chart of Figure A1.3 shows the sample average annual 
growth rate of real wages for high-skilled and low-skilled workers. 
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Figure	  A1.2.	  Sample	  Average	  Annual	  Growth	  of	  Real	  wages,	  by	  Skill	  Level	  
 
 
These growth rates are all positive and larger than for the production 
prices, but also differ markedly across countries in average per year. We 
also observe they are quite close for the low and high-skilled wages. 
A1.4 Variance Analysis 
We have explained in Section 3 of the text why, in addition to the 
necessary inclusion of country*industry fixed effects, we have included 
country*year fixed effects in estimating regression model (1), and why we 
did not also include industry*year fixed effects. We also refer to Cette et al. 
(2016) to clarify why these two specifications tend to respectively provide 
upper and lower range estimates, which can be indeed verified in Tables 1 
and 2. One important reason we put forward was the trade-off between 
exacerbating attenuation biases from errors in variables and correcting for 
omitted variables and stricto sensu endogeneity. Such trade-off mainly 
depends on the reduction of variability in the dependent and independent 
regression variables, which is resulting from introducing fixed effects and 
which can often be massive. Tables A1.1 and A1.2 show in detail how such 
reduction is increasing with the progressive introduction of fixed effects. 
The analysis of variance in Table A1.1 starts from the regression 
specification in levels with country*industry fixed effects that we 
privileged. The analysis of variance in Table A1.2 starts from a 
specification in first-differences that also control for country*industry 
fixed effects by first-differencing country*year observations, but is more 
vulnerable to errors in variables than the fixed effect country*industry or 
“within country*industry” that we favor. 
In both tables, each column gives the residual standard-deviation of the 
regression on a sequence of fixed effects for each of variables in our analy-
sis. Thus in Table A1.1, column (1) shows the dispersion if we were 
including only the country, industry and year fixed effects 𝜂! ,   𝜂! , 𝜂! 
while column (2) shows by how much this dispersion is reduced by also 
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including the country*industry fixed effects 𝜂!" (which we have to do 
since all our variables are computed from country*industry indexes equal 
to 1 by construction in a given reference year). 
Columns (3) and (4) document the further reductions in dispersion by 
including respectively the country*year fixed effects alone, which is our 
preferred specification, or both the country*year and industry*year fixed 
effects 𝜂!"   and   𝜂!". We can observe that the residual standard deviations 
in column (3) are particularly small and that they are even smaller in 
column (4) for INM_p, the indirect price impact indicator with respect to 
non-manufacturing, and for JL_w and JH_w, the low and high-skilled im-
pact indicators. 
This accounts for the relatively large standard errors of the 
corresponding estimated elasticities of our preferred estimates in column 
(6) of Table 1 in the text. It also accounts for the significant drop in these 
elasticities in column of Tables 1 and 2, which is probably related to the 
exacerbation of measurement errors biases. 
 
Table	  A1.1.	  Analysis	  of	  Variance	  of	   the	  Regression	  Variables	   in	   log	  Levels	  Controlling	  
Sequentially	  for	  Fixed	  Effects	  
	  	   	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
Fixed	  effects	  
Country,	  industry,	  year	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	  
Country*industry	   N	   Y	   Y	   Y	  
Country*year	   N	   N	   Y	   Y	  
Industry*year	   N	   N	   N	   Y	  
MFP	  (mfp)	   0.235	   0.162	   0.163	   0.079	  
US	  MFP	  (mfpus)	   0.168	   0.161	   0.164	   -­‐*	  
Direct	  prices	  in	  
	  Manufacturing	  industries	  (DM_p)	   0.08	   0.067	   0.067	   0.051	  
Non-­‐Manuf.	  Industries	  (DNM_p)	   0.042	   0.031	   0.03	   0.028	  
Indirect	  prices	  from	  
	  Manufacturing	  industries	  (IM_p)	   0.038	   0.033	   0.03	   0.019	  
Non-­‐Manuf.	  Industries	  (INM_p)	   0.007	   0.007	   0.003	   0.002	  
Country	  wages	  *	  industry	  labor	  share	  
	  High	  Skills	  (JH_w)	   0.071	   0.009	   0.007	   0.004	  
Low	  Skills	  (JL_w)	   0.106	   0.015	   0.009	   0.005	  
Degree	  of	  freedom	   2766	   2571	   2433	   2173	  
Observations	   2820	   2820	   2820	   2820	  
*The	  variability	  in	  (𝑚𝑓𝑝!")	  is	  necessarily	  null	  when	  controlling	  for	  industry*year	  fixed	  effects.	  Columns	  (1),	  
(2),	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  give	  the	  standard	  deviations	  of	  the	  variables	  after	  controlling	  for	  fixed	  effects.	  
 
Estimation in country*industry log first differences may be easier to 
interpret than estimation in within country*industry log levels, which is 
what we do in another way by including in the specification of regression 
(1) the country*industry fixed effects 𝜂!". The columns (1), (2) and (3) of 
Table A1.2 thus correspond respectively to the columns (2), (3) and (4) of 
Table A1.1. We can indeed verify that the comparable evidence. Actually 
when we estimate regression (1) in country*industry log first differences, 
we obtain estimated elasticities that are not qualitatively different but that 
tend to smaller and have higher standard errors. In fact within level 
estimators have the advantage of being less affected by potential measure-
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ment errors in variables than estimators in first differences, which why we 
prefer the former in the present analysis (see Mairesse, 1990). 
 
Table	  A1.2.	   Analysis	   of	   Variance	   of	   the	   Regression	  Variables	   in	   country*industry	   log	  
Differences	  Controlling	  Sequentially	  for	  Fixed	  Effects	  
	  	   	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	  
Fixed	  effects	  
Country*year	   N	   Y	   Y	  
Industry*year	   N	   N	   Y	  
MFP	  (mfp)	   0.066	   0.064	   0.052	  
US	  MFP	  (mfpus)	   0.058	   0.057	   -­‐-­‐-­‐*	  
Direct	  prices	  in	  
Manufacturing	  industries	  (DM_p)	   0.03	   0.028	   0.021	  
Non-­‐Manuf.	  Industries	  (DNM_p)	   0.018	   0.018	   0.018	  
Indirect	  prices	  from	  
Manufacturing	  industries	  (IM_p)	   0.016	   0.011	   0.008	  
Non-­‐Manuf.	  Industries	  (INM_p)	   0.004	   0.002	   0.002	  
Country	  wages	  *	  industry	  labor	  share	  
High	  Skills	  (JH_w)	   0.004	   0.003	   0.002	  
Low	  Skills	  (JL_w)	   0.007	   0.003	   0.003	  
Degree	  of	  freedom	   2590	   2432	   2172	  
Observations	   2591	   2591	   2591	  
*The	  variability	   in	  (𝑚𝑓𝑝!")	   is	  necessarily	  null	  when	  controlling	   for	   industry*year	   fixed	  effects.	  Column	  (1)	  
gives	  the	  standard	  deviations	  of	  the	  first	  difference	  of	  the	  variables,	  while	  columns	  (2)	  and	  (3)	  gives	   them	  
after	  controlling	  respectively	  for	  country*year	  fixed	  effects	  and	  both	  country*year	  and	  industry*year	  fixed	  
effects.	  
Appendix 2 OECD Regulation Indicators 
In this Appendix, we present shortly the OECD regulation indicators on 
which we rely to calibrate our manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
production prices indicators and our low and high-skill wages indicators. 
They are precisely: 1) the Non-Manufacturing Regulation (NMR) indica-
tors (available for five non-manufacturing industries), 2) the Harmonized 
Tariffs (HT) indicators, available for manufacturing industries, and the 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) restrictiveness indicators for the construc-
tion and hotels & restaurants, 3) and the Employment Protection Legisla-
tion (EPL) indicators. 
A2.1 NMR Indicators 
The OECD NMR indicators measure the extent to which competition 
and firm choices are restricted where there are no a priori reasons for 
government interference, or where regulatory goals could plausibly be 
achieved by less coercive means. They are based on detailed information 
on laws, rules, market and industry settings and cover energy (gas and 
electricity), transport (rail, road and air) and communication (post, fixed 
and cellular telecommunications), retail distribution and professional 
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services (see Conway and Nicoletti, 2007, for a more detailed presenta-
tion).8 
The Bar chart in Figure A2.1 documents the values of the NMR indica-
tors and the corresponding lightest regulation practices for 2013.9 The 
year 2013 is the one chosen to construct the lightest regulatory practices 
taken as target of the ex-ante policy simulation presented in the text.10 We 
observe differences that can be very important both between country and 
within country across the four non-manufacturing industry regulations. 
 
Figure	  A2.1.	  OECD	  Non-­‐Manufacturing	  Regulation	  (NMR)	  Indicators	  in	  2013	  
 
Scale	  0-­‐6	  for	  each	  indicator,	  0	  for	  the	  most	  pro-­‐competitive 
A2.2 HT and FDI Indicators 
The OECD Harmonized Tariff (HT) indicators are computed on the ba-
sis of the ad valorem tariff rates applied to the most favored nation at the 
six-digit level of the Harmonized System Product Classification. They are 
aggregated into indicators using import-based weights at the two-digit 
(ISIC Rev. 3) industry level. These indicators are coded between zero and 
six with zero for the smallest tariffs (see Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003, for a 
more detailed presentation).  
Since no HT indicators do not exist for the ‘Construction’ and ‘Hotels 
and restaurants’ industries, we use for them the OECD Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) restrictiveness indicators. These indicators measure 
                                                
8      Note that we cannot include banking and financial services in our analysis, since the 
indicator of regulatory restrictions for this industry has been constructed by Serres et 
al. (2006) only for the year 2003.  
9      Note that the 2013 OECD NMR indicators take into account new questions. Using the 
updates provided by OECD results in insignificant changes in our estimation results.  
10     However, note that, since the HT indicators are not available after 2007, we have 
simply assumed they remain constant afterwards for the purpose of our calibration 
and ex-ante simulation.  
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different forms of discrimination against foreign firms, such as i) re-
strictions on foreign ownership, i.e. limitations of the share of companies’ 
equity capital in a particular sector that are not applied to domestic firms; 
ii) obligatory screening and approval procedures for foreign affiliates; iii) 
operational constraints or controls for affiliates of foreign companies, 
including constraints to the mobility of foreign professionals working in 
these affiliates. They are primarily based on information from the GATS 
Commitments and country submissions to the OECD Code of Liberaliza-
tion of Capital Movements (see Koyama and Golub, 2006, for a more de-
tailed presentation).  
The Bar chart in Figure A2.2 records the HT and FDI indicator values in 
2007 (the last year for which the HT indicator information is available), as 
well as the corresponding values of the lightest regulation practices. As in 
the case of the NMR indicator values, we observe major differences be-
tween country and within country across industry. We see in particular 
that harmonized tariffs are very high in the food products (ISIC code 
15-16) and in the textiles (17-19), with significant differences between 
countries. 
 
Figure	  A2.2.	  OECD	  Harmonized	  Tariff	  (HT)	  and	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  (FDI)	  
Indicators	  in	  2007,	  by	  Country-­‐industry	  
 
Scale	  0-­‐6	  for	  each	  industry,	  0	  for	  the	  smallest	  tariffs.	  The	  2-­‐digit	  (ISIC	  Rev.	  3)	  industries	  (with	  their	  codes	  in	  
parentheses)	   codes	   are	   the	   following:	   food	   products	   (15-­‐16),	   textiles	   (17-­‐19),	  wood	   products	   (20),	   paper	  
(21-­‐22),	  chemicals	  products	  (23-­‐25),	  non-­‐metallic	  mineral	  products	  (26),	  metal	  products	  (27-­‐28),	  machinery	  
n.e.c.	   (29),	   electrical	   equipment	   (30-­‐33),	   transport	   equipment	   (34-­‐35),	   manufacturing	   n.e.c.	   (36-­‐37),	  
construction	  (45)	  and	  hotels	  &	  restaurants	  (55).	  
A2.3. EPL Indicators 
The OECD provides various labor market regulation indicators: 
unemployment replacement rates, expenditures on labor market 
programs, statutory minimum wages, union members and Employment 
Protection Legislations (EPL). Bassanini and Venn (2008) provide an 
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empirical analysis of the impact of these various indicators on productiv-
ity. 
Our analysis focuses on the EPL indicators, which are the most fre-
quently used in the empirical literature on the impact of labor market 
regulations on productivity and growth. Like the NMR indicators, the EPL 
indicators are based on detailed information on laws, rules and market 
settings. They measure the procedures and cost involved in dismissing 
individual workers with regular contracts (data on collective dismissal is 
available only since 1998) and regulations on temporary contracts, includ-
ing regulations on fixed-term and temporary work agency contracts (see 
OECD Employment Outlook 2013 for more information).  
The Bar chart in Figure A2.3 shows the values of EPL on regular and on 
temporary contracts in 2013 as well as the lightest practice. We observe 
that are higher in continental European countries relatively to the other 
countries, and particularly as concerns regular contracts. 
 
Figure	  A2.3.	  OECD	  Employment	  Protection	  Legislation	  (EPL)	  indicators	  in	  2013	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Appendix 3. Ex-post Simulation from 2008-2013 
Regulatory Changes and Assessment of the Dynamic 
Adjustment 
A3.1 Ex-post Simulation from 2008-2013 Regulatory Changes 
We have based our ex-post simulation only on the evidence provided 
by the OECD. NMR and EPL indicators, since the HT indicators are not 
available after 2008 (as noted in footnote six in the text). We have not also 
been able to include in our simulation the USA, since the HT indicators is 
also lacking too for 2008 for this country. The Bar chart in Figure A3.1 
documents what have been the changes in these indicators over the period 
2008-2013.  
 
Figure	  A3.1.	  OECD	  NMR	  and	  EPL	  Indicators	  Changes	  over	  2008-­‐2013	  Period	  
	  
Scale	  of	  the	  indicators	  in	  levels:	  0-­‐6,	  0	  for	  the	  most	  pro-­‐competitive	  level.	  
 
The Bar chart in Figure A3.2 shows the long-term MFP gains that can be 
expected from these regulatory changes. It is similar to Figure 2 in the text 
for the expected long-term MFP gains under the extreme hypothesis of an 
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immediate implementation in all countries of the 2013 lightest regulatory 
practices. The evaluation method is the same in the two cases as explained 
in Section 4 of the text. We have simply aggregated the country*industry 
estimated MFP gains at the country level by weighting them by the value 
added industry shares in national GDP. The differences in long-term MFP 
gains across countries are thus directly related to the differences in the 
changes in NMR and EPL regulatory reforms. The estimated MFP gains 
are highest for Italy, then France and Austria. It is important to keep in 
mind, however, that these are long term expected gains, and that on the 
basis of our rough assessment of adjustment speed we can consider that 
only about 20% to 30% of these gains have possibly been achieved as of 
2014. 
 
Figure	  A3.2.	  Simulated	  Long-­‐term	  MFP	  Gains	  Expected	  from	  the	  NMR	  and	  EPL	  
Regulatory	  Changes	  over	  2008-­‐2013.	  
	  
EPL	   –	   High-­‐Skilled	   and	   EPL	   –	   Low-­‐Skilled:	   Long-­‐run	   impacts	   through	   high	   and	   low-­‐skilled	   wages,	  
respectively.	  
NMR	   –	   Indirect	   and	   NMR	   –	   Direct:	   Long-­‐run	   indirect	   and	   direct	   impacts	   through	   production	   prices	   in	  
non-­‐manufacturing	  industries,	  respectively.	  
A3.2 Assessment of the Dynamic Adjustment 
The DOLS estimator presented in section IV provides the long-term 
coefficients of the estimated relationships. To assess the dynamic path of 
impacts of the reforms, we rely on simple error-correction regressions and 
proceed in two steps. First, we compute the error-correction terms, noted 
EC, as the differences between the current values of our dependent varia-
bles (𝐷𝑀_𝑝 ,   𝐷𝑁𝑀_𝑝 ,   𝐼𝑀_𝑝 ,   𝐼𝑁𝑀_𝑝 ,   𝐽𝐻_𝑤 ,   𝐽𝐿_𝑤 ,   and   𝑚𝑓𝑝)   and their 
long-term prediction.11 Then, we regress, the observed first differences in 
                                                
11     Note that this difference would be equal to the residual of the long-term estimation if 
we used OLS, but this not anymore the case with DOLS. 
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these variables (with ∆ indicating a first difference) on the corresponding 
lagged error-correction terms: 
 Δ𝐷𝑁𝑀_𝑝!"# = 𝜋! ∙ 𝐶𝐸!"#!!! + 𝜖!"#!   Δ𝐷𝑀_𝑝!"# = 𝜋! ∙ 𝐶𝐸!"#!!! + 𝜖!"#!   Δ𝐽𝐻_𝑤!"# = 𝜋! ∙ 𝐶𝐸!"!!! + 𝜖!"!   Δ𝐽𝐿_𝑤!"# = 𝜋! ∙ 𝐶𝐸!"!!! + 𝜖!"!   𝛥𝑚𝑓𝑝!"# = 𝜋!"# ∙ 𝐶𝐸!"#!!!"# + 𝜖!"# 
 
Table A3.1 presents the corresponding estimation results. As expected, 
a positive error-correction term has a negative and significant impact on 
the growth of production prices, real wages and multifactor productivity. 
 





Relative	  production	  price	  growth	  
(Δp)	  
Real	  wage	  growth	  (Δw)	  
Non-­‐manuf.	   Manuf.	   High-­‐skilled	   Low-­‐skilled	  
	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	  
Error	  Correction	  
term	  (EC)	  
-­‐0.215***	   -­‐0.235***	   -­‐0.025**	   -­‐0.119***	   -­‐0.066**	  
[0.013]	   [0.027]	   [0.010]	   [0.036]	   [0.033]	  
Observations	   2820	   753	   2067	   225	   225	  
R-­‐squared	   0.095	   0.088	   0.004	   0.056	   0.039	  
***	  significant	  at	  1%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  *significant	  at	  10%.	  Standard	  errors	  between	  brackets.	  
